returned and with submissive gestures began to groom Mike. [1986:426] Mike seems to have reasoned his way to the construction of this signal, which fit in iconically with the stone rolling more typically employed but which had the added advantage of loud, clattering, and apparently frightening noise. Goodall notes that "while all of Mike's contemporaries had the opportunity to use these cans, and most of them occasionally did so, only Mike profited from the experience and used it to further his own ends" (1986:426) .
Other examples of strategically reasoned signal construction and deployment could be given, but this perhaps suffices to demonstrate that the role of the neocortex in fashioning communicative signals is by no means unknown in the chimp world. Mike had an objective-the intimidation of other more dominant males along the way to his achievement of dominant status-that was seriously limited by his physical size and strength. However, through apparent ingenuity he was able to construct signals that allowed him to overcome his physical shortcoming. I should remark that there is no evidence in this example of the other chimps using their own intelligence to decode the signal. They seem to have responded instinctively, as if operating under limbic control. From the perspective of ethnographically describable communicative interactions in humans-including ritual lamentationthis is a key point, and I will return to it subsequently. the age of thirty months [Vicki] used only three words and these not always appropriately" (1951:144). However, the film footage of Vicki reveals a considerable ability to control parts of the vocal apparatus in response to cues from Keith Hayes. She is able to produce somewhat recognizable versions of the English words papa, mama, and cup. She learns to control the opening and closing of her mouth to produce a [p]-like sound-although the sound appears actually to be a bilabial click or kiss-like sound, but it is a close enough imitation and she can produce it on cue. She produces as well a [t]-like sound-probably an alveolar click. She produces a velar fricative sound that is able to pass for a [k] in her articulation of cup. She even produces, with more difficulty, an [m]-like sound in which she has to achieve control over not only her mouth but also, in some measure, her velum. So she seems to have at least a rudimentary ability to manipulate her upper vocal tract in her efforts to imitate the humans around her and to produce language-like consonantal sounds.
Where she falls down is in her control over the larynx. She cannot seem to turn the vocal cords on and off at will. In the case of mama, the consonants and vowels she produces are entirely voiceless. She does not activate her vocal cords at all in the course of this articulation. The result is a phonetically highly marked form, with a low degree of perceptual salience. Vicki's pronunciation of papa also suffers in this regard. While her [p]s (or clicks) are voiceless, her [a]s, contra the principle of maximal salience, are also voiceless. For this reason, her pronunciation of papa appears as barely intelligible, perhaps only recognizable because we know beforehand what she is supposed to be saying. The same problem emerges again in the case of cup. The entire word is articulated without the benefit of vocal cord vibration. In addition, of course, the [k] she produces is really a voiceless velar fricative. The resulting syllable can be discerned only with some difficulty.
Indeed, there is no evidence in the Hayeses' experiments that Vicki was ever able to activate her vocal cords to imitate the usual, basic, or unmarked form of the human vowel-that is, the voiced form. They remark that, while Vicki "developed a type of play which is superficially similar to babbling. . . the sounds are produced entirely by mouth vibration without use of the larynx" (1952:108). She was able to control her upper vocal tract articulatory organs reasonably well: her lips, mouth, tongue, and even velum. She may even have been able to shape her mouth to produce different kinds of vowels. This is not clear. But she could not activate her larynx in imitation of the humans around her.
IS THERE NEUROANATOMICAL EVIDENCE FOR SEPARATE NEOCORTICAL AND LIMBIC PATHWAYS OF CONTROL OVER THE LARYNX?
I have said that metasignaling involves the relationship between a neocortically shaped signal and a limbically driven one. The idea of two differently controlled signals--the one fashioned after the other by processes of reasoning that later become routinized-is not just an abstract construct designed to make sense of such phenomena as ritual lamentation. It is a construct that has a counterpart in neuroanatomy. There are, in humans, two separate neural pathways for laryngeal activation, as Uwe Jiirgens (2001) has proposed based on studies of brain lesions as well as on experimental data on nonhuman primates. In humans, production of true linguistic sounds originates in the motor area of the neocortex,6 the evolutionarily more recent outer layer of the brain that has mushroomed in the course of human evolution. Neural fibers from that area project downward through the midbrain in what is known as the pyramidal tract. Some of the motor neurons eventually connect with the nucleus ambiguus in the medulla, which in turn directly controls the laryngeal muscles. This is what allows humans to sing a musical note and to consciously manipulate its pitch.
If the facial motor area of the neocortex is destroyed, humans lose the ability to voluntarily produce linguistic sounds, though they are still capable of producing groans, whimpers, and laughs (Jiirgens 2001). Destruction of the analogous brain area in the squirrel monkey produces no observable effect on vocalizations, leading to the conclusion that the neocortex is not centrally involved in the production of those vocalizations.
In nonhuman primates, call production is thought to be triggered by the anterior portion of the cingulate cortex. The cingulate cortex forms part of the evolutionarily ancient inner brain area. It is one of the structures making up the so-called limbic system and one, in particular, associated with emotion in humans. In squirrel monkeys, electrical stimulation of the anterior portion of the cingulate cortex elicits species-specific calls (Jtirgens and Zwirner 1996) . The cingulate cortex, rather than descending to the lower brain via the pyramidal tract, as in the case of the neocortical signal, descends instead into the central (or periaqueductal) gray of the midbrain. Jiirgens and Zwirner (1996) At the same time, there appear to be at least some connections between the neocortex and larynx even in squirrel monkeys. Jtirgens and Zwirner (1996) have studied the effects of pharmacological blocking of the squirrel monkey midbrain. Once the central (or periaqueductal) gray was blocked, the researchers were unable to stimulate the vocal cords through the cingulate pathway, but they were able to do so via the facial motor cortex.7 Their conclusion is that "these results point to the existence of two separate vocal fold control pathways at midbrain level: one limbic, responsible for non-verbal emotional vocal utterances, and one neocortical, responsible for the production of learned vocal patterns" (1996:2921) . This suggests that the neurological connections for the kind of metasignaling proposed here were present, in at least rudimentary form, in our nonhuman primate ancestors.
WHY IS NEOCORTICAL CONTROL OVER THE LARYNX IMPORTANT ANYWAY?
Laryngeal control is a key to the origins of language because it is central to the production of syllables. If distinct syllable types can be readily produced and perceived, especially in the course of a single utterance stretch, then the conditions are established for those syllables to enter into meaningful contrast with one another, such as occurs in the classical Saussurean system. Figure 2 shows (Jakobson and Waugh 1987 ). An interesting fact about this contrast, from the point of view of stylized crying and language origins, is that it involves control over the larynx-both excitatory and inhibitory control. Human children learn to turn the vocal cords on and shut them off, even though the entire syllable may last for only one-quarter of a second (see Figure 3) . The result is a syllable [pa] that is maximally recognizable as a particular type of syllable as opposed to others. Hence, laryngeal control is essential to the development of one of the most basic and universal of syllable types.
In the case of mama, the syllable internal contrast does not involve voicing versus voicelessness. Both the [m] sound and the [a] sound require vibration of the vocal flaps. The contrast between them, rather, is that between nasal consonant and oral vowel, the air coming out the nose in the one case and out the mouth in the other. However, the perceptual recognizability of the syllable is dependent on control over the larynx. It is crucial that both of these sounds are made with the vocal cords vibrating.
One has to be able to turn the vocal cords on at the appropriate moment and then to turn them off again. If humans were not able to control the larynx-to turn it on in the first place-they would produce a voiceless nasal consonant and a voiceless vowel. Both of these phonetic types (voiceless nasal consonant and voiceless vowel) are highly marked. They occur as phonemic in few languages around the planet. They tend to be acquired, in child development, after other more basic sounds. This suggests that a voiceless version of mama would be less perceptually distin- the case, for whispered words are whispered precisely so as to conceal them from others.
The conclusion I draw from this is that control over the vocal cords is essential to the development of language as a distinctive kind of communicative system. Individuals must be able to learn to turn the vocal cords on and turn them off again with split second precision. This is something that Vicki, seemingly, could not learn. If a typical syllable lasts one-quarter or one-third of a second, the production of [ma] requires that the vocal cords be turned on and then off again within that time frame. In the case of the [pa] syllable, the voiceless consonants may last only one-tenth of a second, after which the vocal cords must be made to vibrate. So the kind of control that is presupposed by stylized crying-fine-grained control over the larynxis also presupposed by the proliferation of syllable types that is essential to the production of Saussurean contrasts and, hence, to the peculiar type of meaning associated with language. If we can understand how and why neocortical control over the larynx originated, we can begin to understand how (and perhaps why) rudimentary language, in the form of a system of syllables in contrast with one another, itself might have originated.
IS THERE EVIDENCE FOR NEOCORTICAL CONTROL OVER THE LARYNX IN CHIMPS, AND, IF SO, HOW MIGHT THAT CONTROL EVOLVE IN THE DIRECTION OF LANGUAGE?
The answer to the question, "Is there evidence for neocortical control over the larynx in chimps?" is yes. Jane Goodall describes an intriguing situation in this regard. She writes:
On one occasion when Figan was an adolescent, he waited in camp until the senior males had left and we were able to give him some bananas (he had had none before). His excited food calls quickly brought the big males racing back and Figan lost his fruit. A few days later he waited behind again, and once more received his bananas. He made no loud sounds, but the calls could be heard deep in his throat, almost causing him to gag. [1986:125] The larynx with its vocal cords, and apparently other components of the lower vocal tract airstream mechanism, were receiving excitatory signals from the limbic or other brain areas at the same time as they were receiving inhibitory signals presumably from the neocortex.9 Neocortical control over vocal production, in this one dramatic instance, at least, seems to conflict with innate affective control, with strategic reasoning only partially winning out. The struggle to control innate vocalization is of evolutionary significance. In the human line, the decisive victory went to the neocortex. How might this have developed?
To answer that question, we need to know whether it is possible not only to suppress an innately triggered laryngeal pattern but also to neocortically induce the pattern. Again, Goodall supplies intriguing ethnographic evidence. Wondering whether chimpanzee "infants may learn to make use of their mothers' protective responses" (1986:582), she writes:
My first observation of this behavior occurred as I followed Fifi and her four-year-old son, Frodo, who was being weaned. After he had twice tried to climb onto his mother's back and twice been rejected, he followed slowly with soft hoo-whimpers. Suddenly he stopped, stared at the side of the trail, and uttered loud and urgent-sounding screams, as though suddenly terrified. Fifi, galvanized into instant action, rushed back and with a wide grin of fear gathered up her child and set off-carrying him. I was unable to see what had caused his fear response. Three days later, as I followed the same mother-infant pair, the entire sequence was repeated. And, a year later, I saw the same behavior in a different infant, Kristal, who was also being weaned.
Were these infants lying? Or was their fear real; were they suddenly frightened of maternal rejection? Obviously more observations are necessary, but I am of the opinion that they were intentionally manipulating their mothers. [1986:582] Rather than strategically inhibiting an innately triggered cry, as in the case of Figan and the bananas, Frodo neocortically triggered a cry that also has an innate trigger. He did not modulate the cry once it had started; the cry progressed along apparently innately prescribed pathways. But he was able, evidently, to initiate the cry in the absence of the appropriate external stimulus; and he was able to manipulate it to achieve a social end. Together, the cases provide possible evidence for both neocortical excitation and neocortical inhibition of the larynx. However, the laryngeal control the chimps possess is anything but fine grained. The cries can be triggered or inhibited but not finely modulated. There is no evidence, in the case Goodall describes, that the mother responded to the cry as stylized. Instead, she reacted to it as a signal of danger. She acted accordingly to protect her child. It is true that protection consists in the mother paying attention to the child, taking it up, and carrying it off. Hence, as in ritual lamentation, as I have described, the cry resulted in sociability. But there is no evidence that the cry was stylized, even if it was induced by neocortical reasoning in the young chimp, or that the mother reasoned about it as such. The mother appears to have treated the cry as a simple indexical signal.
Yet the seeds are here for the manipulation of crying into a stylized form. Suppose, for example, that the mother observed the absence of a situation of danger when the child emitted the distress signal. This is, after all, what Goodall herself observed. And chimps seem capable of strategic reasoning about the signals they themselves produce, even if not about the signals they receive. Instead of treating the signal as a simple index, the mother might treat it-if she, in fact, appreciates that no danger is present-as a kind of metasignal. She would recognize the iconic similarity between the vocalization and the danger cry, but she would also recognize its difference, namely, the absence of the external danger. In the situation described by Goodall, Fifi provided no evidence that she made the distinction between the signal and the metasignal. She treated the two in apparently the same way. But the differentiation would seem to be something not far beyond her grasp or that of any intelligent chimp.
Were the differentiation made, the mother would find herself in a position to try out different responses to the son in an effort to solve the problem that the danger-like signal poses for her, namely, the problem of how to get the son to stop emitting the cry, which might potentially disrupt her ongoing activities as well as those of other individuals around her. If she did reason from the relationship between metasignal and signal, she might respond with actions on her part that would resemble her response to the signal but simultaneously be different from them.
Were such the case, for example, in the anecdote above, Fifi might not have taken Frodo up and carried him off but, rather, have interacted with him in some other way that was satisfying to him. A vocal response to the cry on her part, for example, a muffled or partially inhibited cry, might suffice. Frodo, for his part, might also observe that the response was formally distinct from what he would have expected from Fifi through an emission of the danger signal. This could lead him to explore possible modulations of the danger cry that might induce the satisfying vocal response, rather than the "taking up" response associated with the danger cry.
Mutual treatment of crying as metasignal rather than signal seems a giant step forward in the evolution toward language, one that has to be better understood, but it seems also a step that could have taken place long before language as we know it, or even a minimally contrastive set of syllables, emerged. For once crying operates as metasignal, the larynx and the vocal cords become the targets of neocortical manipulation of an otherwise instinctively controlled vocal apparatus. The transition from instinct to culture, in this area, occurs in the transition from signal to metasignal. I have attempted to diagram this in Figure 4 . There we see (in the upper half) the child's signal-a danger cry in Frodo's case. At the level of a signal, this would be understood (in the absence of any other evidence to the contrary) as a limbically driven, instinctive verbal cry. However, the additional factor observed by Goodall is the absence of a stimulus for the instinctive cry-that is, the absence of a situation of danger. Consequently, Goodall interprets this as a deception on the child's part. The "danger cry," in this situation, is a neocortically fashioned strategic ploy to get the mother's attention. The attention is gotten by making the mother feel that danger might be lurking. If the mother recognized the "danger cry" as a metasignal, however, she might treat it as a problem to be solved, and she might stumble on a communicative solution, namely, producing a signal that sounded like the one her son was producing but was obviously different from it, perhaps a muffled version of the cry, as in Figan's attempt to suppress the food call. Both individuals would be producing something like the same vocal communication. A true cultural signal, neocortically driven, might thus take shape. The child might have motivation for differentiating the deceptive "danger cry" from a real one. He may want to produce in his mother the verbal response rather than the protective response. The metasignal would become a stylized version of the signal. And it would be neocortically driven (having its origins in strategic manipulation) rather than limbically driven. Hence, it would represent a socially constructed signal that would be, simultaneously, an elementary form of culture.
Note the premium that is placed, in this scenario, on control by the neocortex over the larynx. If there is motivation to stylize cries-whether cries of danger, pain, hunger, or some other sort-then there is motivation to control or shape those cries, and that means control over the larynx. Some control is already present in Frodo's deception of his mother-if that is, in fact, a correct interpretation of the situation. To deceive, he had to be able to induce the cry. But that induction might be of a primitive sort-a neocortically triggered vocal call but one that was not neocortically nuanced and shaped. Once triggered, it would be indistinguishable from the instinctive call. Neocortical shaping would require attention to more finegrained modulation of the call, perhaps a partial inhibition of the innate signal. That modulation in turn would come to signal the very desire for sociability itself, a desire to produce the socially appropriate form of the metasignal.
Of course, the scenario I have described ends up looking like stylized or ritualized crying in human populations. In human society, ritual crying does not induce other people to comfort the crier. This is what one would expect if the others were interpreting the cry as a signal, as diagrammed in Figure 4 . Instead, ritual crying induces others to ritually cry, as mentioned earlier. People indicate their empathy for the crier by crying themselves.11 And they do so in modulated cries that sound like those of the original lamenter. That stylized lamentation is so widespread in human societies indicates just how successful it is at accomplishing its principal goal-producing sociability.
HOW DO NEOCORTICALLY FASHIONED VOCAL SIGNALS BECOME SOCIALLY STANDARDIZED AND, HENCE, PART OF CULTURE? (THROUGH THE PARENT-CHILD BOND)
Social standardization of the signal within the motherchild relationship is already part of the previous hypothetical account. If the mother responds to the child's false cry with her own vocalization (modulated cry), the child may learn to modulate its own cry after the image of the mother's in order to induce the vocal response. To understand more about social standardization, I turn to child language acquisition research to see how it takes place in contemporary humans. Lamentably, the vast bulk of this research in the last few decades focuses on the period of age 18 months and older, that is, the period when the What most struck me at the time about her acquisition of linguistic sounds was the way they seemed to take shape progressively out of the crying that characterized her early infancy, as if she were struggling mightily to control that cry, bring it under the sway of the neocortex. At seven months, she produced cry breaks as part of a manipulated stream of sound, where she was learning to take control of the larynx. Her [m]s at seven months often showed tonal modulation and were part of larger cry-like utterances.
In all of this, neocortical control over the vocal cords and larynx was developing in connection with manipulations of the cry. That control emerged out of a great struggle in which she seemed to have been engaged. When she was first born, her wails were spontaneous. By six months she was making, seemingly, great strides toward controlling them and turning the protracted cry into a modulated, syllable-like form. Simultaneously, protoconsonants were taking shape that also involved control over the larynx. What is all of this control about?
My contention is that it is about pre-linguistic but nevertheless vocal communication. In M. A. K. Halliday's (1975 Halliday's ( , 1984 readily recognize, we cannot be sure that they are culturally specific signals because they do not sufficiently resemble the linguistic signals produced by adults. Evidence for neocortically controlled, linguistically specific, and socially standardized shapes serving communicative purposes seems to develop between eight months and one year. At 11 months, my daughter was employing a number of recognizable wordlike signals and using them in appropriate contexts, for example, [kikae] when she noticed a cat going by, the sound shape clearly resembling the parents' regular usage of "kitty cat" in this context, or [daedi] for daddy. In Halliday's study, Nigel, when he was one year old, had 28 distinguishable meanings communicated by separate vocalizations. Of these, eight or nine (see Figure 5 ) appear to be imitations of the adult vocalizations to which Nigel was exposed.12 Further study by Vihman and DePaolis (2000) confirms the centrality of imitation prior to one year of age. However, neocortical control over vocalizations at this juncture is not simply a function of imitation of adult forms. Halliday remarks that, during this phase, "there is no obvious source for the great majority of the child's expressions" (1975:22 ). Yet Nigel was coming up with vocalizations in an attempt to communicate, and his communications were, presumably, in considerable measure neocortically driven. So there are at least two separable components to the achievement of neocortical control over the larynx: one is the strategic deployment of vocalizations in an effort to communicate by differentiating out new vocalizations; the other is the attempt to copy adult forms for communicative purposes. It is that latter copying process that results in standardization.
Social standardization of the signal (and, hence, sharing) depends on the mutual metasignaling discussed in the previous section and summed up in Figure 4 . It is not inconceivable that the first reciprocal signal was a muffled or inhibited cry in imitation of the child's vocalization, as I have proposed. In any case, if, by genius or luck, the mother hit on a cry that was obviously iconic with the If the signal allowed protohumans to solve some of their social problems, without forcing them to disrupt their productive activities, it could be of considerable significance. This is already apparent in the mother-child case. If the mother were not required to stop her productive activity to pick up a child in need of social connection but, rather, could satisfy the child's need vocally while simultaneously continuing to work, some incremental adaptive advantage is gained. Correspondingly, if adults find themselves able to solve some of their interactional problems through such vocalization, without having to halt other activities, they acquire a slight advantage over others.
The This process is a risky one and highly susceptible to failure, for the signals individuals come up with may be inadequate in one or the other (or even both) ways described above. In Nigel's case, recall that fewer than onethird of his vocalizations resembled adult forms. Although Halliday was able to assign meanings to them, such assignments are by no means straightforward. Children at this age (around one year) are far from perfect communicators. I think we have to imagine that our earliest ancestorsstruggling as they must have been to deploy signals that could be interpreted-were probably also far from perfect communicators. We can imagine them trying out new vocalizations, only to find that they were unable to achieve the effect they had contemplated. So that there is no possible confusion, let me emphasize that the new communicative capability would have been cultural. We are not dealing with one signal being favored over another through biological selection-that is, as the result of genetic mutation producing a different, better adapted limbically triggered signal. Rather, biological selection would favor the capacity to produce and interpret new signals. It would operate to reinforce the connections between neocortex and larynx, rather than between limbic region and larynx. It would produce, in short, a more flexible signaling system, one whose signal forms and meanings could be socially learned and socially transmitted, one in which new signals could be not only produced but also more or less correctly interpreted by others.
We have no fossils of ancestral chimpanzees, presumably because they lived in tropical areas that were not conducive to the fossilization process (Johanson and Edey 1981:363) . If the line that led to chimps and the line that led to humans were once indistinguishable, then, or so the reasoning goes, our own earliest ancestors probably lived in that same nonfossilizing area. Therefore, even the very earliest Australopithecine fossils may indicate radiation out of ancestral environments and into new ones.
It is not inconceivable that radiation was made possible by the establishment of socially standardized, neocortically controlled vocal signals.14 Such signals may have been a leading rather than trailing edge of adaptation.
They could thus conceivably have enabled our earliest ancestors to more effectively cope with new and changing environments, beginning a process of radiation that would result in their dispersal around the planet and now, perhaps, beyond.
HOW DO SOCIALLY STANDARDIZED SIGNALS BECOME DETACHED FROM THEIR OBJECTS?
A central mystery of language-origins research is, "How did signs develop that are not directly linked to their objects by contiguity (indexicality) or similarity (iconicity)?" Studdert-Kennedy describes this detachment as "freedom from control by identifiable external stimuli (displaced reference)" (2000:161). Present-day human languages can be readily deployed to talk about events, objects, people, and places far removed in space and time from the act of speaking, and the signs used to talk about such displaced referents have no detectable physical similarity to the referents themselves. The phrase "the bronzed rocks and the dark jungle" need not be uttered or written near the rocks or jungle it describes, and, in any event, the graphic symbols or spoken words do not physically resemble what they mean. How did such semiotic devices come into existence?
A merit of the metasignaling approach is that it provides an answer to that question. The pathway of reasoning through which the metasignal is produced or interpreted goes through both icons and indexes, as portrayed in Figures 1 and 4 . However, the iconic connection is between metasignal and signal, not between signal and object. In other iconic theories of language origins-for example, the onomatopoetic or "bow wow" theory proposed The earliest neocortically fashioned, socially learned vocalizations are a far cry, so to speak, from human languages, with their elaborate lexicons and intricately woven grammars. Similarly, Nigel's and Jessica's vocalizations were at eight months of age far from anything resembling the language they would later come to possess. Does this early evolutionary scenario shed any light on the end product?
The kind of semiotic reasoning that I have proposed for our human ancestors can be extended to something resembling grammar. In fact, those familiar with historical structural linguistics will recognize these processes-involving reasoning from the relationship between signal forms to the relationship between their meanings, and vice versa-as the core analogical principle of language more generally. In the present evolutionary scenario, it is the repeated application of this neocortically guided reasoning process that gives rise to new signals and, ultimately, to language, including the morphological complexity of words and the syntactic relations among them.
I do not propose to treat this matter in detail here, for it is so well studied already. Still, it may be helpful to look at one example in order to illustrate the continuing operation of those processes that may have given birth to the earliest metasignals. Take the meaning of the word alcoholic-"one who drinks alcohol to excess." Native speakers of American English appear to have reasoned about this meaning as if it were meaning2 in Figure 6 with "alcohol" as meaning1. They treat the word alcoholic as form2 with respect to alcohol as form1. Because the two meanings are related to each other as "one who drinks alcohol to excess" is to "alcohol," they construe the word form alcoholic as containing a formal mark for "one who does to excess." The question is, What is that formal mark? Were the two signs (alcohol and alcoholic) the only two in play, the question would be moot. However, the question becomes relevant when the signs form part of a larger set in which one can reason from similarities and differences in physical forms to similarities and differences in meanings. All of this, in some sense, is contained in the initial semiotic recognitions, however dim, associated with the metasignal-signal relationship, whereby the metasignal carries over something from the signal through iconicity but asserts its distinctiveness through difference. Distinctiveness indicates the presence of new meaning, but similarity allows a guess as to where that new meaning might be found. The metasignal-signal relationship depends on the coordination of two types of relationship: one between like terms (form to form or meaning to meaning) and the other between unlike terms (form to meaning or meaning to form). And it is this ancestral reasoning about signals, as part of the lifeblood of individuals and communities struggling to adapt to new environments and changing circumstances, that leads ineluctably to the fossilization process to which Emerson alluded. Yes, language is fossil poetry. It is the deposition in stony outline of potent communicative forms invented and deployed by creatures struggling to achieve neocortical mastery over a mercurial world. Should we prove lucky, we may one day, through the mutual reinforcement of distinct lines of researchsuch as discourse-centered ethnography and comparative neurobiology-catch a glimpse of that pulsating if transient life behind these curious stones.
GREG URBAN Department of Anthropology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104 NOTES developed in other species-but as part of innately triggered vocalizations. Although courtship songs may have arisen in the early evolution of the human line, if they were spawned by the kinds of processes hypothesized here for mother-child interactions, they too would have to be strategically reasoned inventions, like Mike's kerosene cans, built on the model of already existing signals but distinguished from them in obvious and important ways. As neocortically controlled signals, they could then be socially transmitted from individual to individual as part of culture. The advantage here would be the higher probability of sexual selection, with cleverly constructed vocal signals resulting in increased likelihood of mating. Music as the precursor to language-a notion not so far removed from that of modulated cries, such as I have proposed-is an old idea in the philosophical literature, being especially prominent in the 18th century in the writings of Rousseau and Herder, among others (Tomlinson 2000 ). 14. One should not conclude from this that language as we know it today must have emerged at some remote period. The elementary communicative forms I am suggesting are very far, in evolutionary terms, from modern language. It is not inconceivable, indeed, that the full-blown form of language did not emerge until the dispersion of anatomically modern humans in the past 200,000 years or even, for that matter, the 30-40,000-year time frame proposed by Chase and Dibble (1987). 15. I have attested all of these forms in the speech of university students. Some have not and may never achieve wide circulation, but the possibility is there through the work of analogy.
